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Abstract. Rules of thumb have been developed to assist appraisers in dealing with the
uncertainties that abound when easement values must be estimated. An economic analysis
of one popular rule-of-thumb technique, based on a ﬁxed percentage of the value of a
hypothetical fee simple interest in the affected land, reveals that such methodology could
not generally be expected to yield meaningful results. If a rule of thumb were to be
employed, its use would be more supportable if the underlying assumptions reﬂected the
nonlinear structure of land values.
Introduction
In this issue, our article ‘‘Valuing Easements: A Simple Bargaining Framework,’’
offers an economics-based framework for estimating easement values in some
situations. Our work was motivated, in part, by concerns over ﬁxed percentage rules
of thumb sometimes used by appraisers who must estimate easement values. In the
discussion that follows, we address a common rule-of-thumb technique for valuing
easements, offering some arguments that might seem to support such a rule, but
ultimately demonstrating why this type of rule could not yield consistently valid
answers. While our goal is not to establish a different rule-of-thumb standard, or to
promote the use of rule-of-thumb techniques, we do demonstrate that rules of thumb
could be used more reliably if they reﬂected the idea, as generally observed, that the
value of land does not vary linearly with parcel size.
Using Rules of Thumb to Value Easements
Because of the difﬁcult nature of easement valuation, parties that must acquire or
appraise easements have, over the years, developed rules of thumb for estimating the
applicable values. These rules of thumb are often based on ﬁxed percentages of
hypothetical fee simple values for the affected land. For example, appraisers have
used geometric formulas in computing such percentages for use in valuing aircraft
avigation easements (Hall and Beaton, 1965). In a different context, a utility ﬁrm
might offer to pay 10% to 15% of the estimated value of a fee simple interest in the
affected acreage in order to gain a temporary easement (Pattison, 1986),1 and those
valuing scenic easements have traditionally found it useful to think in terms of
percentages of underlying property values (Sutte, 1966; and Williams and Davis,
1968). The ﬁxed percentage chosen for this type of rule can fall within a wide range;
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Exhibit 1
Linear and Nonlinear Land Value Functions
one study of easement appraisals showed value estimates for temporary or permanent
easements ranging from 0% to 100% of the values that would prevail if the claims
on the burdened parcels instead represented fee simple interests (Corey, 1989). Some
courts have ruled that a permanent easement denies the underlying fee owner the use
of the property and, therefore, should be compensated at 100% of the value of the
affected land;2 while others have ruled that an easement is treated by the law as less
valuable than fee title, and therefore must be compensated to a lesser degree than
could be a fee interest.3 Generally, the law does view an easement as having lower
value than a fee interest. In fact, if the language in documents of conveyance leaves
ambiguity as to whether a fee or easement interest has been created, courts sometimes
consider as evidence the amount of consideration that was paid.4
One rule of thumb that has sometimes been employed in condemnation situations is
to value an easement at 25% of the value of a hypothetical fee simple interest in the
quantity of land encompassing the easement, a rule that has been used at least since
the early 1950s (Wall, 1952). For example, if a governmental unit desired an easement
across a privately-owned parcel, and if the market price for purchasing the strip of
land outright would be $4,000, then the estimated value of a mere easement over the
strip would be .25 3 $4,000 5 $1,000. Could such a general rule, which suffers from
the weakness of always treating larger easements as more valuable (despite the fact
that someone needing access to a parcel would likely seek the shortest possible route),5
and of treating all easements as equally burdensome, generate meaningful estimates
of easement values? Exhibit 1 provides a structure for an initial analysis of this issue.NONLINEAR EFFECTS IN EASEMENT VALUATION 221
The exhibit is a representation of land values in a particular market. The curved line
extending from the origin represents the total value, in that market, for parcels of
varying potential sizes ranging up to A0 acres. The line’s curvature indicates that the
change in land value with respect to parcel size is described by a nonlinear (more
speciﬁcally, a concave) function; as the size of the parcel increases, value increases,
but at a decreasing rate. Thus, a parcel twice as large as some benchmark parcel is
not worth twice as much as the benchmark or, viewed another way, a parcel only half
the size of the benchmark parcel is worth more than half as much as the benchmark.6
The work of Colwell and Sirmans (1978, 1980) and others provides justiﬁcation for
the assumption that the area/value relationship is nonlinear. A simple nonlinear value
function can be expressed as:
b V 5 cA ,
an equation in which V is the value of the subject parcel of land, c represents the
effect on value of factors unrelated to the size of the parcel, and A is the land area,
which we might think of as some number of acres. The exponent beta (b) is the
percentage change in price associated with a percentage change in parcel size (the
area elasticity of price); its magnitude determines the curvature of the total land value
function. A b of 0 would indicate no increase in value as parcel size increases, while
a b of 1 would indicate direct proportionality in the area/value relationship. If an
increase in parcel size is accompanied by a less-than-proportional increase in value,
as shown in Exhibit 1, then b must be greater than 0 but less than 1. The appropriate
choice of b is an empirical question, the answer to which would vary with locality
and with land use.7
Why Fixed Percentage Rules of Thumb Might Seem To Work
Consider a case in which a government agency condemns an easement over a strip
of land measuring (A0 2 A1) acres, situated on a servient estate A0 acres in size. The
area that remains unencumbered therefore is A1 acres. In Exhibit 1, the value of a
parcel of size A0 is shown as height x, while the value of a parcel of size A1 is shown
as height y; in the market represented, the complete loss of (A0 2 A1) acres reduces
the value of the owner’s holding by the dollar amount represented as distance (x 2
y). The amount (x 2 y) therefore should be the estimate of the easement’s value if
the servient estate’s owner deems the easement’s creation to be tantamount to a full
taking of rights over the (A0 2 A1) affected acres.
Yet anecdotal evidence, including the examples offered in appraisal texts, suggests
that appraisers continue to base their land value estimates on average per-acre values,
such that the area/value relationship is implicitly assumed to be linear.8 In Exhibit 1,
the slope of the solid straight line extending outward from the origin measures the
average value per acre for a fee simple interest in a tract of size A0. If land value did
vary linearly with area, then a fee simple interest in a parcel of size (A0 2 A1) acres
could be represented by height (x 2 z), whereas if we can assume that the value
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noted earlier, represented by height (x 2 y). If we were to compute the correct
(nonlinear) fee simple value loss (x 2 y) from the average (linear) function, we would
therefore have to multiply the amount (x 2 z) by some percentage s. The appropriate
level of compensation thus would be C 5 (x 2 y) 5 (s)(x 2 z) if the servient estate
owner deemed the easement’s burden to equate to a full loss in value for the affected
land.9
To examine this result within the context of Exhibit 1, assume that A0 is twenty acres
and A1 is sixteen acres, such that there is a four acre easement on a twenty acre
servient estate. If recent comparables involving fee simple transactions indicate that
a twenty acre parcel should be worth x 5 $50,000 ($2,500 per acre, on average), and
the government therefore attributed to a sixteen acre parcel a value of z 5 16 3
$2,500 5 $40,000, then the appropriate compensation for the taking of a fee interest
in the four lost acres might initially appear to be 4 3 $2,500 5 $10,000. Of course,
if the land value function is nonlinear as shown, then the true value of a sixteen acre
parcel is y (perhaps $47,500, consistent with a b of .23 in our nonlinear value function)
rather than z ($40,000), and the appropriate compensation for taking a fee simple
interest in the four acres should be (x 2 y) 5 $2,500 rather than (x 2 z) 5 $10,000.
Recall that s is the percentage we must apply to a linearly-determined average value
in order to derive a true nonlinearly-determined fee simple value. If the government
applied a ﬁxed 25% rule of thumb in valuing easements (s 5 25%), then its estimate
of the appropriate compensation for taking only an easement over a four acre portion
of the twenty acre servient estate would, in our example, be .25 3 $10,000 5 $2,500
5 (x 2 y). The servient estate owner would actually be correctly compensated —
through a circuitous and probably unintended route—if the easement’s burden was
viewed as tantamount to a 100% taking.
Why Fixed Percentage Rules of Thumb Do Not Work
The use of such a ﬁxed percentage rule of thumb is, however, fraught with problems.
One problem is that the value s, which is (x 2 y)’s percentage of (x 2 z), must itself
be an amount that varies with the magnitudes of A0, A1 and b (the curvature of the
land value function), as a quick examination of Exhibit 1 should reveal. More
speciﬁcally, we must solve for the appropriate s factor with the formula:
b 1 2 (A /A ) 10 s 5 .
1 2 (A /A ) 10
The uniqueness of s for several possible A1/A0 and b combinations is shown in Exhibit
2.
Note that A1/A0 5 .8 in our numerical example (with A0 5 20 and A1 5 16), so an
s value of approximately 25% (shown more precisely in Exhibit 2 as .250) emerges,
if the easement is seen as effectively taking the full bundle of rights on the affected
land, only if b is .23 in our V 5 cAb function.10 Yet a .23 b value is unrealistically





0.23 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.9 0.239 0.311 0.413 0.513 0.613 0.711 0.808 0.905 1.000
0.8 0.250 0.324 0.427 0.528 0.627 0.723 0.817 0.910 1.000
0.7 0.263 0.338 0.443 0.545 0.642 0.737 0.828 0.915 1.000
0.6 0.277 0.355 0.462 0.564 0.660 0.752 0.839 0.921 1.000
0.5 0.295 0.376 0.484 0.586 0.681 0.769 0.851 0.928 1.000
0.4 0.317 0.401 0.511 0.613 0.705 0.789 0.866 0.936 1.000
0.3 0.346 0.433 0.546 0.646 0.735 0.814 0.883 0.945 1.000
0.2 0.387 0.479 0.593 0.691 0.774 0.845 0.905 0.956 1.000
0.1 0.457 0.554 0.669 0.760 0.832 0.889 0.935 0.971 1.000
even if it were credible, an s value of .25 would be inappropriate for any A1/A0 value
other than .8. Note that if b were .5, the correct s percentage would range from 51.3%
to 76.0% for the various A1/A0 magnitudes shown. From Exhibit 2, it should be
evident that a ﬁxed percentage rule of thumb measure could not be workable over the
wide range of circumstances that can characterize land values relative to parcel sizes.
Another serious problem follows from the partial nature of the easement interest.
Because the servient estate’s owner will be prevented from fully using the affected
portion of land, an easement will be viewed, whether acquired through eminent
domain or in an arm’s length negotiation, as imposing a burden. However, if (as would
be likely in most cases) the owner perceived only a portion of the affected land’s
value to have been lost through the easement’s creation (rather than being equivalent
to a full taking), then the perceived percentage loss would be less than 100%, and the
true loss in value would be less than (x 2 y) in our example. We can represent the
perceived burden as k, a percentage of the value of a hypothetical fee simple interest
in an (A0 2 A1) acre parcel, such that the appropriate level of compensation for the
taking of a partial interest—in this case, an easement—should be C 5 k(x 2 y) 5
(k)(s)(x 2 z). If the landowner perceived the creation of an easement to be tantamount
to a full taking of the land involved, then k would be 1 and C would equal (x 2 y),
but with k , 1, as we would generally expect, the appropriate compensation C would
be less than (x 2 y).11
Thus, for a ﬁxed percentage rule of thumb (as applied to average value) to provide a
useful estimate of the damage the easement causes to the owner of the servient estate,
the percentage factor would have to be ks, a magnitude less than the percentage of
value lost (i.e., ks , k, such that s , 1).12 In other words, the percentage used in a
rule of thumb applied to linearly-determined values must reﬂect not only the
nonlinearity of the true land value function (s), but also the fraction of fee simple
value deemed to be lost (k) by the imposition of an easement. The idea that a ﬁxed224 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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rule-of-thumb percentage, such as 25%, could correctly and consistently incorporate
the wide range of possible s and k values is implausible.13
Assume, for example, that the goal of the rule of thumb were to provide compensation
equaling only 25% of the true fee simple value of the affected acreage. The
appropriate compensation therefore would be (k)(x 2 y) 5 (k)(s)(x 2 z) 5 (.25 3
.25) 3 $10,000 5 $625, whereas the application of a 25% rule of thumb to the
linearly-determined loss in fee simple value would indicate .25 x $10,000 5 $2,500.
Using the rule of thumb thus would overcompensate, paying the owner four times the
perceived burden on the affected land. In fact, simply applying a ﬁxed percentage to
a linearly-measured fee simple value will always overcompensate14 the value loss, if
the true value function is concave.15 In our example, involving A1/A0 5 .8 and b 5
.23, (k)(s) 5 (.25)(.25) 5 6.25%, a ﬁgure substantially lower than the 25% frequently
used.
Exhibit 3 illustrates the percentage of the hypothetical fee simple value that the land
owner would be compensated under speciﬁc percentage rules of thumb. To compute
each of these percentage-compensated levels, we multiply the ﬁxed rule-of-thumb
percentage by the reciprocal of the s factor. Because the rule of thumb percentage
equals ks, our computation yields the ‘‘k’’ fraction implicitly being compensated when
a ﬁxed percentage rule of thumb is applied to linearly-determined values. The resulting
amounts are shown for various ﬁxed percentage rules and relative easement sizes, and
for b values of 0.23, the value that caused the 25% rule of thumb initially to seem
plausible, and 0.50, a more realistic value based on formal evidence and informal
observations [Colwell and Munneke (1997) found a b value of approximately .50 for
vacant land of various types, based on data from the Chicago area].
In our example, with A1/A0 5 .8 and b 5 .23, a combined percentage factor (ks)o f
25%, applied to a linear value measure, would lead ultimately to a level of
compensation equivalent to an implicit k 5 100%, not the intended 25% of the fee
simple value of the affected land. Exhibit 3 conﬁrms this outcome (a 1.00 value
appears in Column 2 of Row 2, Panel A). And this result, like others we have
described, holds only if b is .23, a magnitude that would be considered too low under
many circumstances.
If we were to compute a similar value based on a more realistic b of .50, the
compensation generated by applying a 25% rule to the linear measure of value loss
would be an implicit k 5 47%, not the intended 25% of the true fee simple loss (note
the .47 value in Column 2 of Row 2 in Panel B of Exhibit 3), a less severe
overcompensation but still clearly in excess of the 25% target. Furthermore, if b were
to be only .23, then a rule of thumb based on a ﬁxed ks percentage even as low as
25% would lead to compensation of more than 100% of the affected land’s
hypothetical fee simple value for higher A1/A0 magnitudes (i.e., with the easement
covering only a small proportion of the servient estate, as we would typically expect).
In fact, under the conditions described, any ﬁxed percentage rule would compensate
more than the indicated loss in value (even the smallest number in each column isNONLINEAR EFFECTS IN EASEMENT VALUATION 225
Exhibit 3
Implied k Percentage of True Fee Simple Value Compensated by a Fixed
Percentage Rule of Thumb
A1/A0
% Rule of Thumb
0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.90 1.00
Panel A: b 5 0.23
0.9 0.84 1.04 1.25 1.67 2.09 2.51 2.92 3.13 3.34 3.76 4.18
0.8 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.60 2.00 2.40 2.80 3.00 3.20 3.60 4.00
0.7 0.76 0.95 1.14 1.52 1.90 2.29 2.67 2.86 3.05 3.43 3.81
0.6 0.72 0.90 1.08 1.44 1.80 2.17 2.53 2.71 2.89 3.25 3.61
0.5 0.68 0.85 1.02 1.36 1.70 2.04 2.38 2.54 2.71 3.05 3.39
0.4 0.63 0.79 0.95 1.26 1.58 1.89 2.21 2.37 2.53 2.84 3.16
0.3 0.58 0.72 0.87 1.16 1.45 1.74 2.03 2.17 2.32 2.60 2.89
0.2 0.52 0.65 0.78 1.03 1.29 1.55 1.81 1.94 2.07 2.33 2.59
0.1 0.44 0.55 0.66 0.88 1.09 1.31 1.53 1.64 1.75 1.97 2.19
Panel B: b 5 0.50
0.9 0.39 0.49 0.58 0.78 0.97 1.17 1.36 1.46 1.56 1.75 1.95
0.8 0.38 0.47 0.57 0.76 0.95 1.14 1.33 1.42 1.52 1.70 1.89
0.7 0.37 0.46 0.55 0.73 0.92 1.10 1.29 1.38 1.47 1.65 1.84
0.6 0.35 0.44 0.53 0.71 0.89 1.06 1.24 1.33 1.42 1.60 1.77
0.5 0.34 0.43 0.51 0.68 0.85 1.02 1.19 1.28 1.37 1.54 1.71
0.4 0.33 0.41 0.49 0.65 0.82 0.98 1.14 1.22 1.31 1.47 1.63
0.3 0.31 0.39 0.46 0.62 0.77 0.93 1.08 1.16 1.24 1.39 1.55
0.2 0.29 0.36 0.43 0.58 0.72 0.87 1.01 1.09 1.16 1.30 1.45
0.1 0.26 0.33 0.39 0.53 0.66 0.79 0.92 0.99 1.05 1.18 1.32
greater than the percentage that constitutes the column’s heading), for any b value
less than 1.00.
A More Workable Rule of Thumb
The idea of ﬁxed percentage rules of thumb thus is ﬂawed, not only because such
rules have typically been applied to linearly measured land values, but also because
the magnitude of k surely would differ from case to case. The ideas presented in
Exhibits 2 and 3 do point, however, to a more defensible framework for developing
rules of thumb. A relationship that takes into account the potential for a nonlinear
value function, and is applied to the servient estate’s total fee simple value, can be
written as:
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Under this method, if the easement were deemed to impose a 25% loss on the owner,
we would ﬁnd the proper $625 compensation for our example by multiplying the
larger tract’s full fee simple value of $50,000 by .0125, computed as 0.25 3 [1 2
(16/20).23]. The bracketed factor reﬂects the correct percentage change in value for
the complete loss of (A0 2 A1) acres, and applying the appropriate k factor provides
the correct compensation for the partial loss imposed by an easement or other partial
interest.
This technique differs from the use of ﬁxed percentage rules; note that instead of
simply applying a standard percentage to an average value based on an estimate of
x, the appraiser must estimate the values of b and k, along with x, although if b 5 1
our rule becomes a ﬁxed percentage rule. (The ﬁxed percentage rule therefore is a
special case of our more general rule.) While ﬁnding supportable b and k percentages
might seem to be very difﬁcult exercises in themselves, a rule that incorporates these
magnitudes would provide a more supportable measure of the loss in value that an
easement would impose. This requirement does not actually place new duties on the
appraiser. After all, k should be estimated in any easement appraisal that is based on
underlying fee values; and the recognition of nonlinearities, along with the correct b
measurement of the degree to which value changes with parcel size (perhaps through
the examination of varying sized comparables) should be an important step in the
value estimate for any fee or partial interest. Allowing k to assume a value of 1 renders
this C computation a useful structure for estimating the appropriate compensation in
full fee simple sales or takings, as well as in easement or other partial interest
valuation cases.
Conclusion
The argument that a widely-used rule of thumb might be empirically, if not
theoretically, valid is consistent with the economic argument that common law leads
to efﬁcient outcomes because the court rulings that are further litigated are those that
have provided inefﬁcient distributions (Cooter and Ulen, 1997). If a ﬁxed percentage
rule of thumb has, in some situations, become a standard because both grantors and
grantees tend to accept the resulting distributions, then supporters of such a technique
might argue that there is some underlying method in what seems, in some ways, to
be only madness. A more plausible argument, however, might be that ﬁxed percentage
rules have gained acceptance, especially in condemnation situations, because their use
(if applied to average per-unit values) compensates more than the purported percentage
when marginal land values are decreasing. After all, an ‘‘overpaid’’ recipient would
be loath to complain, and the taxpayer-ﬁnanced easement purchaser might lack the
incentive to battle for the lower compensation that theory would suggest, especially
in light of the higher attendant legal and administrative costs.
Fixed percentage rules of thumb, as applied to linearly-determined land values, ignore
the demand side of the market, and the relationships that underlie any existing
relevance are subject to change. Therefore, values derived through the use of quick
formulas such as the 25% rule might best be avoided, in favor of the results obtained
through more thorough analyses. Any rule of thumb clearly should be utilized onlyNONLINEAR EFFECTS IN EASEMENT VALUATION 227
if it can be shown empirically to have validity. A more defensible rule would have to
reﬂect the nonlinearities that typically characterize land values. The framework that
we have suggested would be useful in valuing the loss of part or all of the bundle of
rights accompanying a particular quantity of land, although estimating the b factor
that describes the nonlinear value function, and even the degree of burden k, could,
in many cases, be difﬁcult.
Notes
1 Examples of rules of thumb ranging from 10% to 25% of the fee value, based on such
considerations as the placement of the easement on the burdened parcel, are offered by Green
(1992).
2 Chicago Mill and Lumber Company vs. Board of Directors, 236 Ark. 322, 366 S.W. 2d. 184,
cited in Eaton (1995).
3 Mitchell vs. Texas Electric Service Company, 299 S.W. 2d. 183 (Tex.), cited in Eaton (1995).
4 See Bruce and Ely (1988:1/141).
5 On the demand side of the analysis, we would expect a party who needs to gain access to a
parcel to seek an easement involving the smallest lineal distance or land area. A smaller
easement area minimizes the initial cost of paving or otherwise improving the affected land,
and also minimizes the ongoing cost of traveling across the servient estate and maintaining
(plowing, repairing) the easement.
6 We therefore treat marginal prices, in this situation, as falling. Actually, marginal prices might
be expected to fall in some instances and to rise in others. Rising marginal prices would reﬂect
a condition long known as plottage, an outcome often observed in central business district
locations, where a developer must assemble numerous existing tracts to create a parcel of
sufﬁcient size to meet the demands of buildings constructed in the modern era. Our example
of declining marginal values reﬂects the phenomenon now known as plattage [a term apparently
coined by Colwell and Sirmans (1980)], in which falling marginal values lead developers to
subdivide land. This latter effect is often observed where an established community borders on
the surrounding agricultural area.
7 A b value between 0 and 1 would reﬂect plattage in the market, while a b value exceeding
unity would reﬂect plottage in the market.
8 Appraisers certainly understand the nonlinearity idea, but do not seem to apply the idea much
in practice. Even appraisal texts, which discuss the underlying theoretical issues, generally offer
numerical examples that reﬂect linear assumptions.
9 The owner’s perception of a condemned easement as equivalent to a full taking is consistent
with Fischel’s (1985) observation that the involuntary nature of eminent domain can impose
disutility on the affected landowner beyond the market value of the rights lost.
10 If V 5 cAb, then values of $50,000 for 20 acres and $47,500 for 16 acres are consistent with
a b of (ln 50,000 2 ln 47,500)/(ln 20 2 ln 16) 5 (10.81977828 2 10.76848499)/(2.995732274
2 2.772588722) 5.23. Stated differently, note that the 16 acre parcel’s $47,500 value is 95%
of the 20 acre parcel’s $50,000 value, and that 16b/20b 5 .95 only if b 5 .23.
11 If k reﬂected a market-determined degree of disutility, then we could call C the ‘‘just
compensation’’ level in an eminent domain situation. Because in a broader valuation context
(including arm’s length negotiations) k could include a particular landowner’s idiosyncratic or
other personal sense of loss (‘‘investment value’’), we identify C more generically as an
‘‘appropriate’’ compensation level.
12 Recall that the example involves a market characterized by decreasing marginal values. In a
case involving increasing marginal values, s would exceed unity.228 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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13 The value of k would vary with the views of a particular owner and with the circumstances.
Even if an appraiser ignored individual effects by estimating the burden that a ‘‘typical’’
landowner might perceive under the speciﬁc circumstances, the wide range of possible
circumstances would serve to render ﬁxed percentage rules of thumb unworkable.
14 The result would ‘‘overcompensate’’ relative to what the rule of thumb purports. Yet even
this amount might not be overcompensation in the eyes of the servient estate’s owner, whose
investment value for the affected land might greatly exceed any market value measure.
15 It would, similarly, underestimate the loss if the land value function were convex, with
increasing marginal values.
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